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Abstract
This paper tests an equilibrium condition from a model that incorporates: (1) altruism of parents toward their young
children, and (2) household production of latent health risks. The model demonstrates that an altruistic parent’s marginal
rate of substitution between an environmental health risk to herself and to her child is equal to the ratio of marginal risk
reduction costs. Econometric estimates support this prediction based on data from a stated preference survey involving 488
parents of children aged 3–12 years. This outcome implies that parents reallocate family resources to at least partly offset
the effectiveness of public programs that aim to reduce their children’s environmental risks.
r 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: Q51; Q58; D13; D64
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1. Introduction
Special protection of young children from environmental hazards has become a worldwide priority in
government policies to improve human health.
1 Effectiveness of these measures depends on what steps parents
voluntarily take to keep children out of harm’s way. If parents are naive about hazards, do not care about
their children, or lack the resources to protect their health, implementation of well-designed public policies to
increase protection of children may have the intended effect. On the other hand, if parents are informed,
altruistic, and sufﬁciently well off ﬁnancially, measures aimed at increasing protection of their children from
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1For example, Executive Order 13045 [21] directs US federal executive branch agencies to assign a high priority to addressing health and
safety risks to children, coordinate research priorities on children’s health, and ensure that their standards take into account special risks to
children. The US Environmental Protection Agency has formulated a seven-step strategy to protect children’s health [34]. Some of the
more visible federal decisions in which protection of children’s health ﬁgured prominently include tightening of air quality standards for
ozone and particulate matter and implementation of the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments and the 1996 Food Quality
Protection Act. Scapecchi [32] summarizes similar efforts undertaken in other countries.particular hazards will be offset to some extent as parents redistribute family resources. In any case, the
fundamental tension between altruism and self-interest in family exchange looms as a crucial behavioral factor
determining the effectiveness of government policies to protect children’s health.
What is known about altruism in families? Several prominent empirical studies (e.g., [14,2,3,28]) do not
support the implication of altruism for transfer-income derivatives in examining inter-household ﬁnancial
transfers between parents and adult children. Other papers (e.g., [29,24,1,20]) look at how parents protect
themselves and their pre-teenage children from environmental and other hazards. In this branch of the
literature, altruism is sometimes mentioned as a possible parental motivation, but equilibrium conditions
implied by altruism are not tested.
This paper tests a household production model that incorporates altruism of parents toward their young
children in the context of latent health risks. The model, an extension of those developed by Becker [5,6] and
Barro [4], demonstrates that the parent’s marginal rate of substitution between risks faced by herself and her
child is equal to the ratio of marginal risk reduction costs. This prediction is tested using survey data on skin
cancer risks faced by 488 Hattiesburg, MS parents and their biological children between the ages of 3 and 12
years. Marginal rates of substitution are obtained from stated preference values for a hypothetical sun lotion.
While stated preference valuation remains a controversial method of obtaining willingness to pay for reduced
environmental risk, its application here supports consistent estimation of the desired marginal rates of
substitution because of the way the survey (described more fully later on) is designed. Test outcomes are
consistent with predictions of the model and suggest that parents are altruistic toward their young children.
2. Conceptual framework
2.1. Model
This subsection presents an extension of Becker’s [6] model of altruism that incorporates household
production of latent health risks. The model envisions a ‘‘family’’ composed of one altruistic parent and one
child. Because only one child is included in the model, the analysis focuses on how parents allocate resources
between themselves and their children, rather than on how parents make tradeoffs among different children.
By including only one parent in the model, a unitary perspective is adopted in which possible divergent
interests between parents in a family are not considered. Although the unitary model has been rejected in
several empirical tests (e.g. [30]), tests presented in Section 4 reveal no signiﬁcant differences in valuation of
latent health risks between fathers and mothers. Blundell et al. [8] and others analyze alternative intra-
household decision-making frameworks.
To facilitate treatment of latent health risks, assume that the parent has two periods of life remaining while
the child has three. During the present period (t ¼ 0), the parent receives all family income, purchases market
goods for her family, and behaves as a paternalistic altruist in that she derives utility from her own
consumption as well as from the combination of goods that she provides to her child.
2 Thus, the parent
allocates goods to the child according to her own views as to what is best and disregards the child’s preferences
(if any) except where they are congruent with her own. In period t ¼ 1, the child will be an adult with his own
income, which the parent may supplement with transfers, and will make his own consumption decisions. In
this period, the parent will derive utility from her own consumption and may also derive satisfaction from the
level of utility achieved by the child. The model therefore envisions that after the child is mature enough to
exhibit well-deﬁned preferences and the parent can no longer dictate the combination of goods that the child
will consume, the parent’s altruism may switch from paternalistic altruism to the more all-encompassing
concern for the child’s well-being considered by Barro [4] and Altonji et al. [3].
3 In the third and ﬁnal period
(t ¼ 2), the child continues to receive income and purchase market goods while the parent is deceased.
The survey, described more fully in Section 3, elicits willingness to pay to reduce two latent environmental
health risks facing both the parent and the child. In the model, these two risks are denoted a and b.T o
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3Both types of altruism are incorporated into the model to assist in clarifying the interpretation of statistical tests presented in Section 4.
All-encompassing concern for another’s well-being has also been termed ‘‘benevolence’’ [7] or ‘‘pure’’ altruism [25,26].
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occur in the last period of either individual’s life. Constraining the lifetime risk to lie in a single period
simpliﬁes the task of communicating changes in risk to survey respondents (see Section 3). Perceptions of the
jth latent risk to the ith person are denoted by R
j
i, where superscript j distinguishes between the two risks
(a and b) while subscript i distinguishes the parent (p) from the child (k). Perceived lifetime risks are inﬂuenced






















it denotes individual i’s use in period t of a market good affecting the jth risk. Simplifying assumptions
here are that: (1) the risk production functions do not shift over time, (2) the child when grown is assumed to
share his parent’s assessment of both risks, and (3) marginal products of the G
j
it are strictly negative in both
production functions.
When the child begins to make his own consumption decisions as an adult in period t ¼ 1, he will maximize
his lifetime utility given by UkðCk0;Ck1;Ck2;Ra
k;Rb
kÞ subject to his perceived risk production functions given in
Eq. (1), the choice of ðCk0;Ga
k0;Gb
k0Þ that already will have been made by the parent, and his lifetime budget
constraint, T þ yk1 þð 1 þ rÞ




k1 þð 1 þ rÞ




k2 . Here and in
Eqs. (2) and (3), variables yit and Cit, respectively, denote individual i’s income and consumption of an
aggregate market good in period t, T denotes the income transfer from parent to child in period t ¼ 1(TX0), r
denotes the market interest rate and Pjdenotes the relative market price of the protective good affecting the
jth risk.











subject to the four perceived risk production functions in Eq. (1), the restriction TX0 and her lifetime budget
constraint
yp0 þð 1 þ rÞ









þð 1 þ rÞ
 1½Cp1 þ T þ PaGa
p1 þ PbGb
p1 , ð3Þ
where ZX0 is the weight the parent places on the child’s lifetime utility and U 
kð Þ denotes the indirect utility
function from the child’s maximization problem. When t ¼ 0, the parent chooses quantities of all market
goods that she and her young child use and when t ¼ 1, the parent makes these choices only for herself while
deciding how much income to transfer to her child.
The parent’s paternalistic altruism in period t ¼ 0 is reﬂected in her concern for her child’s present
consumption and his risk. If Z ¼ 0, the parent has no further concern for the child in future periods and will
not care how his future choices may affect the lifetime risk he ultimately faces. If Z40, the parent continues to
care about the child in the future, but she exhibits benevolence or all-encompassing altruism in that she
respects the child’s adult preferences and cares about his overall level of well-being rather than the speciﬁc
bundle of goods he consumes.
First-order conditions
4 for period t ¼ 0 quantities imply that for j ¼ a, b


















Thus, in period t ¼ 0, the model predicts the familiar result that if both individuals consume C and G in
positive quantities, the parent’s marginal rate of substitution between the child’s consumption of C (G) and her
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k0Þ. Eqs. (4) and (5) also make use of the assumption
that the parent exhibits paternalistic altruism only in period t ¼ 0. Thus her paternalistic altruism encompasses concern for how her
present choices affect her child’s risk but does not extend to concern for how his future choices may alter his risk. Any concern for the child
in future periods is reﬂected by Z40, not by qUp=qR
j
k. This assumption means that the parent does not have to consider the dependence of
her child’s future choices on her decisions today. A more formal analysis of this point is available on request.
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5 This outcome holds independently of the magnitude of Z, the
weight that the child’s utility receives in the parent’s utility function, and also holds if the parent exhibits either
type of altruism. If instead the parent exhibits neither type of altruism (i.e., the parent is not an altruist toward
the child), then these marginal rates of substitution equal zero. If the parent exhibits either or both types of
altruism toward the child but does not care about her own consumption or about the level of risks that she
faces, then these marginal rates of substitution are arbitrarily large.
For periods t ¼ 1 and 2, ﬁrst-order conditions imply that
qUp=qCp1 ¼ lpð1 þ rÞ
 1;
qUk=qCkt ¼ lkð1 þ rÞ














1 t; j ¼ a;b; t ¼ 1;2;
Zlk ¼ lpð1 þ rÞ
 1 if T40:
(5)
Eq. (5) shows that if Z40a n di fT40, then in period t ¼ 1 the parent’s marginal rate of substitution
between the child’s consumption of C (G) and her own consumption of C (G) also is equal to unity. In the case
in which Z40, therefore, transfers from the parent to the child ensure that the parent’s marginal rate of
substitution between the child’s consumption of market goods and her own consumption of market goods is
equal to unity in all periods in which both individuals are alive. If Z40, but T ¼ 0 (as may occur in period
t ¼ 1 if the child is rich and the parent is poor) then the parent’s marginal rates of substitution between her
child’s consumption and her own consumption are positive, but in general are not equal to unity because
Zlk6¼lp(1+r). On the other hand, if the parent is a paternalistic altruist only and has no concern for the child’s
well-being after period t ¼ 0 has ended (Z ¼ 0), then in period t ¼ 1 the parent’s marginal rates of substitution
between her child’s consumption and her own consumption are equal to zero. Finally, just as in period t ¼ 0, if
the parent cares about her child’s well-being but not about her own consumption of market goods, then her
marginal rates of substitution between the child’s consumption and her own consumption become arbitrarily
large.
6
The empirical analysis presented in Section 4 considers risk reduction, not consumption of G
j. So, in period
t ¼ 0, the ﬁrst-order equation for G
j in (4) is rewritten as Eq. (6) to show that when corner solutions are set
aside, the parent’s marginal rate of substitution between risk to her child and risk to herself is equal to the

























; j ¼ a;b. (6)
The ratio of marginal products, in turn, equates to the ratio of present value marginal costs because the price
per unit of G
j is the same no matter who uses it.
Eq. (5) also implies that each individual equates the present-value marginal costs of risk reduction over time,
provided that risk production functions are constant over time. Thus, in period t ¼ 1, the present-value
marginal cost of risk reduction for the parent will be the same as in period t ¼ 0, and the present-value
marginal cost of risk reduction will be the same for the child in periods t ¼ 1 and 2. In addition, if Z40 and
T40, then the marginal costs of risk reduction for the child are the same in all three periods.
7 Evidently, the
parent’s all-encompassing concern for the child’s well-being together with her monetary transfers enables her
to choose marginal cost of risk reduction values that the child will use for the rest of his life. In consequence, if
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5Throughout the paper, the convention adopted for calculating marginal rates of substitution is that the parent’s marginal utility of the
child’s consumption is in the numerator and the parent’s marginal utility of her own consumption is in the denominator.
6Eq. (5) also implies that when the parent and child consume positive quantities of all goods in all periods, the inter-temporal marginal
rate of substitution between consumption of C (G) in period t+1 and consumption of C (G) in period t equals the discount factor (1+r)
 1
for both the parent and the child. The inter-temporal marginal rate of technical substitution between risk-reducing goods in different
periods likewise equals the discount factor for both individuals. If Z40 and if T40, then the parent’s marginal rate of substitution between
her child’s consumption of C (G) in period t+1 and her own consumption of C (G) in period t is equal to the discount factor as well.
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; j ¼ a;b; t ¼ 1;2. (7)
On the other hand, this marginal rate of substitution equates to zero if Z ¼ 0 and will not equate to the
marginal cost ratio if either T ¼ 0 or if the parent does not care about risk to herself.
Together, Eqs. (6) and (7) imply that if Z40 and T40, and both the child and parent consume positive
quantities of all market goods in all periods when they are alive, then the parent’s marginal rate of substitution
between her child’s and her own latent risk equals the ratio of present-value marginal costs of reducing risk in
any period. A further implication of Eqs. (6) and (7) is that even if the parent is a paternalistic altruist in
period t ¼ 0a n di fZ40 and T40, the ratio of marginal risk reduction costs for the child and the parent is not
expected to equal unity because the technologies used to produce perceived risk reduction may differ and, even
if the technologies are the same, levels of perceived risk faced by the two people may not be the same.
8
Empirical estimates described in Section 4 test the null hypothesis that the equilibrium conditions stated in
Eqs. (6) and (7) hold. This test is facilitated by considering percentage risk changes rather than absolute
changes in risk. For instance, when the parent and child experience the same percentage reduction in a risk, the

















; j ¼ a;b.
Thus, in this case, as shown in Eq. (8), the parent’s marginal rate of substitution between equal percentage risk


























¼ 1; j ¼ a;b. (8)






















¼ 1; j ¼ a;b; t ¼ 1;2. (9)
Evidence that Eq. (8) holds supports the notion that parents are altruistic toward their children, but does
not indicate whether parents are paternalistic altruists only, whether parents only exhibit the broader type of
altruism associated with Z40 and T40, or whether parents exhibit both types of altruism. Evidence that
Eq. (9) holds, on the other hand, says nothing about paternalistic altruism, but supports the notion that Z40
and T40. Evidence supporting Eqs. (8) and/or (9) does not indicate whether Z or the provisions the parent
makes for the child ðCk0;G
j
k0;TÞ are large or small. As discussed more fully in Section 4, tests applied do not
distinguish between paternalistic and all-encompassing altruism and do not identify the value of Z.
2.2. Policy implications
The model developed in the previous subsection suggests that effectiveness of government programs aimed
at reducing risk through behavior modiﬁcation will be compromised to some extent because they motivate
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8It also can be shown that for either individual, the marginal rate of substitution between the two types of risk equals the corresponding
ratio of marginal risk reduction costs.
9This outcome also yields a useful corollary for transferring adult morbidity estimates to children when equal proportionate changes in
risk to both groups are considered. If the parent and child experience the same percentage reduction in risk, the ratio of marginal products
in Eq. (4) equals the ratio of initial risk levels. This means that the ratio of the parent’s willingness to pay to reduce risk to the child to the
parent’s willingness to pay to protect herself equates to this ratio of risks. The ratio of actual risks faced might be estimated in some cases
using existing health science and biomedical information. The ratio of perceived risks might be established by studies of parents’ perceived
risks to children and to themselves.
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10 First, suppose that in a
country composed of M identical families,
11 the government initiates an administratively costless program in
time period t ¼ 0 to provide special protection of children from risk. Assume that: (1) the government has
access only to the ‘‘family technology’’ for risk reduction described by Eqs. (1) and (2) the program provides
the parent with an extra unit of G earmarked for the child’s use, (3) the program is ﬁnanced by levying a tax on
each parent in the amount of $P, the price per unit of G,
12 and (4) parents exhibit one or both types of
altruism. As long as prices of market goods and the parent’s income remain unchanged, parents and children
in each family end up consuming the same quantities of all goods as before. In consequence, the program does
not alter behavior and has no effect on the level of risk faced by either person.
Second, suppose instead that the government program sets out to protect everyone (i.e., both adults and
children) from risk by giving each family one unit of G for either person to use, rather than earmarking it for
the child’s use. In this situation, each family simply ‘‘purchases’’ one unit of G for $P from the government
rather than from the private market. Again, if incomes and market prices remain unchanged and parents
behave altruistically, each family member consumes the same quantities of C and G as before so that the
program has no effect on behavior or on risk levels faced by either parents or children.
Third, suppose that the government is more efﬁcient than families in lowering risk, perhaps because of
economies of scale in providing risk reduction. In this case, each family might receive more than one unit of G
in return for the tax payment of $P, thereby experiencing the equivalent of an increase in income. Pure
paternalistic altruists would then divide the income increase between their own consumption of C and G in
periods t ¼ 0 and 1 and their child’s consumption of these goods in period t ¼ 0, with the increment in G
allocated between the parent and the child so that the parent’s marginal rate of substitution between risk to the
child and risk to herself remained equal to the ratio of marginal costs of risk reduction. If in addition to or
instead of paternalistic altruism, parents also exhibit all-encompassing altruism with Z40 and T40, more
substitution possibilities arise because a portion of the income increase could be transferred to the child for use
later in his life. Thus, while the program could succeed in lowering risk, the efﬁciency gain is diffused because
both family members now consume more of all goods in the present period and possibly in future periods.
3. Data and experimental design
3.1. Background
Field data were collected from parents of pre-teenage children during summer of 2002 using a self-paced,
interactive, computerized instrument.
13 An early version of this instrument was used in a pilot study of
parents’ willingness to pay to reduce perceived skin cancer risks [18]. Two subsequent versions of the
instrument were pre-tested and de-brieﬁng sessions with pre-test participants guided development of the ﬁnal
version. Parents who participated in this study were residents of the Hattiesburg, MS metropolitan statistical
area and were initially identiﬁed by random digit dialing. When calls reached adults, interviewers asked
whether they had at least one biological child between the ages of 3–12 living at home, and whether they were
willing come to the University of Southern Mississippi to participate in a federally funded study of health risks
to parents and their children. Interviewers did not mention skin cancer in this initial telephone call. Biological
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10Although the model does not address issues related to government risk information provision or how parents might respond to such
information, it is at least plausible that such programs might be more effective than behavior modiﬁcation programs. Also, along these
lines, note that if in addition to paternalistic altruism, Z40 and T40, parental learning about risks will be retained by the child through
adulthood in the sense that his marginal costs of avoiding a risk are equated through all periods of his life. In this situation, parental
learning may be passed to future generations as well, but a formal investigation of this matter would require reformulating the model to
allow the child to have children of his own as, for example, in Becker [5].
11Further examples based on heterogeneity of parent incomes, two-parent families, and families with multiple children easily can be
constructed based on those presented below. Similar examples also can be developed for models where government policy operates by
determining the level of an environmental hazard that affects child and/or parent risk rather than by providing G, although in that case the
rate of substitution between G and the environmental hazard in the risk production functions must be considered.
12Becker [6, Chapter 8] presents a closely related example with extended discussion in the context of an income transfer between an
altruistic person and his/her spouse.
13A more complete description of these data is provided in Dickie and Gerking [19].
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characteristics inherited from parents (e.g., fairness of skin and sensitivity of skin to sunlight). Parents were
offered a $25 payment for participating in the study.
14
The sample consisted of 610 parents; children did not participate.
15 Of the parents, 75% were white, 20%
were African-American, and 5% were members of other races. Data from the 122 African-American parents
are not considered in this paper (but are analyzed in Dickie and Gerking [19]) because blacks face low levels of
risk and therefore have fewer incentives than whites to think about precautions against solar radiation
exposure and how their own risk might differ from that of their children. Of the 488 non-black parents, 25%
were male, 75% were under the age of 40, mean household income was $60,000 per year, 83% were married,
and 60% worked full time. Parents generally were aware of skin cancer: 83% knew someone personally who
had been diagnosed with this disease, 18% knew of someone (public ﬁgures, friends, or relatives) who had died
from skin cancer, and 82% had considered the possibility that one of their children might get skin cancer. At
an early stage in the interview, one biological child aged 3–12 of each parent was randomly selected (if there
was more than one in this age range) and designated as the sample child. Questions asked mainly focused on
the parent and the sample child. Half (50.4%) of the sample children were male and the average age of sample
children was 7 years.
3.2. Elicitation of risk beliefs
Two types of risk to both parents and children were elicited: (1) the unconditional risk of getting skin cancer
during one’s lifetime, and (2) the conditional risk of dying from this disease given that it occurs.
16 Parents
made preliminary assessments of lifetime skin cancer risk using an interactive scale similar to that used by
Krupnick et al. [27] and Corso et al. [13]. The scale, which underwent a number of design changes based on the
pre-tests, depicted 400 squares in 20 rows and 20 columns and all 400 squares were initially colored green.
Parents changed squares from green to red to represent amounts of risk. Before using the scale to estimate skin
cancer risk, parents practiced using the risk scale for an unrelated event (a possible auto accident) and were
told about the meaning of ‘‘chances in 400’’. Also, they were told to consider only the chances of getting skin
cancer (or of getting it again if they had already had it), rather than how serious the case might be. Parents
then used the risk scale to estimate lifetime chances of getting skin cancer, for themselves and then for their
sample child. Frequency distributions of these responses presented in Table 1 indicate considerable variation
in risk estimates with some parents believing that skin cancer is highly unlikely and a smaller number of
parents believing that skin cancer is inevitable. Risk estimates tended to pile up at the 5, 10, 15, etc. percent
marks.
As shown in Table 2, parents estimated that their own lifetime risk of getting skin cancer exceeded that of
their sample child (26.9% vs. 22.5%). The null hypothesis that mean perceived skin cancer risks are equal for
parents and children is rejected at the 1% level in a matched-samples test. This outcome may reﬂect a number
of factors possibly including parents’ beliefs that they take greater precautions to protect their children from
skin cancer risk than their parents did in an earlier period when less was known about the hazards of solar
radiation exposure. Parents also appear to have overestimated skin cancer risk. Ries et al. [31] found that
whites have a lifetime chance of 21% of getting either melanoma or non-melanoma skin cancer. The fact that
the survey introduced the possibility of getting skin cancer again if the parent had already had it does not
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14Approximately 30% of calls to presumed working residential numbers yielded no contact with an adult after three attempts at
different times of day and days of the week. In 64% of cases in which a call reached an adult, the adult declared that the household did not
meet eligibility requirements (had no biological children aged 3–12 living at home). Parents agreeing to participate in the study constituted
3.5% of working residential numbers, 5% of contacts with adults, and 14.3% of contacts with adults who did not declare the household
ineligible. Finally, 68% of persons agreeing to participate completed the instrument.
15Responses from 25 parents were disregarded either because they did not answer all questions (21 parents) or because they did not
follow instructions given by the survey administrator (4 parents).
16The ability of respondents to understand the risk concepts presented and to clearly distinguish between these two types of risk was a
concern from the beginning of the study because of difﬁculties people have in thinking about probabilities [33]. In consequence, morbidity
risk and conditional death risk questions were extensively discussed with pre-test participants. This discussion led to a number of wording
changes in these questions that were incorporated into the ﬁnal version of the survey.
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reported having been previously diagnosed with this disease.
Parents were given an opportunity to revise their beliefs about the chances of getting skin cancer after
receiving information about this disease. They were told that: (1) according to the National Cancer Institute,
the average person in the United States has a lifetime risk of getting skin cancer of 18%, and (2) a person’s risk
may differ from this average because of skin color and sensitivity to sunlight, family history of skin cancer,
amount of time spent in direct sunlight, experience with sunburns, and use of sun protection products. Parents
were questioned about observable skin characteristics, sun exposure history, and use of sun protection
products both for themselves and their sample children. Over 90% of parents and 97% of children use sun
protection products such as sun lotion. Children use sun protection products a greater fraction of the time that
they are outside and use products with a higher sun protection factor than do their parents (Table 3). About
40% of parents revised their own lifetime risk estimates, but upward and downward revisions balanced to
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Table 1
Frequency distribution of parents’ perceived risks (N ¼ 488)
Risk range (%) Risk of getting skin cancer
a Conditional risk of dying from skin cancer
Parents Children Parents Children
0–4.75 53 46 78 111
5–9.75 24 48 140 169
10–14.75 53 78 112 97
15–19.75 55 62 59 40
20–24.75 55 59 33 28
25–29.75 61 63 22 17
30–34.75 39 32 9 5
35–39.75 22 16 7 5
40–44.75 33 23 4 5
45–49.75 6 4 5 1
50–54.75 49 29 16 9
55–59.75 4 2 1 1
60–64.75 5 5 0 0
65–69.75 0 1 0 0
70–74.75 4 2 2 0
75–79.75 6 5 0 0
80–84.75 2 3 0 0
85–89.75 2 2 0 0
90–94.75 9 5 0 0
95–100 6 3 0 0
aInitial risk assessment.
Table 2
Parents’ mean risk perceptions (%)
Sample Risk of getting skin cancer
a Conditional risk of dying from skin cancer Sample size
All parents 26.93 12.05 488
All children 22.46 9.36 488
Mothers 29.17 12.46 368
Fathers 20.08 10.82 120
Daughters 22.31 9.38 242
Sons 22.61 9.33 246
Children aged 3–7 years 23.84 10.10 275
Children aged 8–12 years 20.68 8.39 213
aInitial risk assessment.
M. Dickie, S. Gerking / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 53 (2007) 323–341 330yield zero mean revision. Revised risk estimates for children were on average 2 percentage points lower than
initial risk estimates.
To obtain a rough indication of beliefs about latency of skin cancer risks, parents were asked, ‘‘Suppose you
do get skin cancer sometime in the future. At what age do you think you would get it for the ﬁrst time (or for
the next time if you have already had it)?’’ Responses to this and a parallel question about the children are
summarized in Table 4. About 65% of parents saw skin cancer as a disease that would strike them or their
children at age 50 or later. Based on the midpoints of the age intervals listed in Table 4, parents on average
expected that skin cancer, if it occurs, would strike them at age 53 or their children at age 55. Comparing
expected age at onset to current age, the average implied latency period is 18 years for parents and 48 years for
children, a difference that is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These rough measures of perceived latency suggest that
parents see skin cancer as a disease that occurs later in life and see their children’s risk as lying farther in the
future than their own.
Parents also provided estimates of mortality risk from skin cancer both for themselves and for their sample
children assuming a doctor had diagnosed this disease. Parents were unaware that they would be asked about
the likelihood of dying from skin cancer when they answered the previously described questions about getting
this disease.
17 Parents provided their perceptions of conditional mortality risk of skin cancer given a diagnosis
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Table 4
Frequency distribution of expected age at onset (N ¼ 488)
Age range (years) Parents Children









Age 80 or later 5 14
Mean age at onset (years) 53 55
Mean age (years) 35 7
Implied mean expected latency period (years) 18 48
Table 3
Use of sun protection products
Parents Children
Fraction of time outdoors that sun protection products used
Never 44 15
Less than half 115 80
About half 109 106
More than half 91 106
Always/almost always 129 181
Sun protection factor normally used
Less than 15 67 15
15 to less than 30 185 103
30 or higher 192 355
17Respondents were instructed not to look ahead or to go back to previous questions but rather to see the survey administrator if they
needed to correct a mistaken answer. Data from 4 respondents who did not comply with this instruction were among the previously
mentioned observations that were deleted.
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bution of responses. About two-thirds of parents believed that their conditional risk of death given a
diagnosis of skin cancer is 10% or less and about three-fourths of parents believed that if similarly
diagnosed, their sample child’s conditional risk of death is 10% or less. Many parents felt that the
conditional risk of death is less than 5% both for themselves and for their children. This outcome suggests
that parents were aware that skin cancer is seldom fatal. Parents reported higher mean conditional
death risk estimates for themselves (12.1%) than for their sample children (9.4%), a signiﬁcant difference at
the 1% level.
3.3. Experimental design and the choice experiment
Parents valued risk reductions by expressing willingness to pay for hypothetical sun lotions.
18 The
products were described using labels designed to look like those on bottles of over-the-counter sun lotions.
19
Except for differences in the type and amount of skin cancer protection offered, the labels were identical
in all respects to control for other possible motivations for purchasing sun lotion, such as to prevent
sunburn or to get a suntan and to guard against aging or wrinkling of skin (see [17]). Eight labels were used in
the study: Four labels varied reductions in risk of getting skin cancer (10%/50% for parent/child) and four
labels varied reductions in conditional death risk (10%/50% for parent/child).
20 As demonstrated in Section 2,
use of percentage changes simpliﬁes the econometric tests. Use of percentage changes in risk also has an
advantage over presenting absolute risk reductions in that the post-treatment risk levels always are non-
negative.
21
Each parent was randomly assigned two of the eight labels and asked for willingness to pay for each.
22
One of the assigned labels offered reduced risk of getting skin cancer and the other offered reduced
conditional death risk from skin cancer. Labels were presented one at a time in randomized order.
After parents were given time to read a label as if considering buying the product for the ﬁrst time, they
were shown their previously marked risk scales both for themselves and their children showing the level
of perceived risk the parent originally indicated, and the risk reduction the sun lotion would offer. In this
way the magnitude of the risk change for the parent and the child was described in absolute as well as in
percentage terms.
For the ﬁrst of the two labels, parents were asked, ‘‘Now please think about whether you would buy
the new sun protection lotion for yourself or your child. Please do not consider buying it for anyone
else. Suppose that buying enough of the lotion to last you and your child for 1 year would cost $X.
Of course, if you did buy it, you would have less money for all of the other things that your family
needs. Would you be willing to pay $X for enough of the sunscreen to last you and your child for
one year?’’ The value of X was randomly selected from among nine values ranging between $20 and
$125. The narrative also reminded parents that lifetime use of the sun lotion is necessary to obtain
the stated skin cancer protection beneﬁts. For the second label, parents were told, ‘‘Suppose that
instead of the previous label, we showed you the following label.’’ Willingness to pay then was elicited as
before.
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18This approach also was used in a recent cross-country study of skin cancer risks (see [9]).
19A ﬁgure depicting an example label is available through the Internet site http://www.aere.org/journal/index.html.
20Although the model treats risk as endogenously determined, the sun lotion labels used in the survey present respondents with
exogenous changes in skin cancer risk. This aspect is further developed in Section 4.
21Data on actual purchases of currently marketed sunscreen lotions would not support valuation of the two risks separately from other
motivations for using sunscreen [16,17] and would not reﬂect random assignment of exogenous risk changes. These two features of the ﬁeld
study are critical for estimating the marginal rate of substitution.
22Means of the four perceived risks, family income, number of children in the family, and age and gender of parent and children were
compared across labels, separately for the four morbidity labels and four conditional mortality labels. Statistical tests fail to reject the null
of a constant mean across labels at 10% for all characteristics except gender of parent across the four morbidity labels. With that one
exception, the randomly assigned labels are orthogonal to important parent and child characteristics. Results of these tests are available at
the Internet site: http://www.aere.org/journal/index/html.
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4.1. Methods and interpretation
Following Cameron [11], the null hypothesis that parents’ stated purchase intentions for the hypothetical
sun lotion are consistent with Eqs. (8) and (9) is tested using a speciﬁcation of the willingness-to-pay function
rather than on an explicit speciﬁcation of a difference in random utility functions. The approach taken is based
on the model developed in Section 2 to derive present period (t ¼ 0) willingness to pay (WTPj) for the
hypothetical sun lotions to reduce the unconditional risk of getting skin cancer (j ¼ a) and the conditional risk
of dying from this disease if it is contracted (j ¼ b).
Each new sun lotion is treated as a newly available private good that would provide an increment, S
j
it,i nt h e
planned amount of protective goods that was considered optimal in the absence of the new sun lotion. If








it ¼ 0. The resulting changes in










it. This speciﬁcation assumes that users of the new sun lotions would not
change other activities to make risk changes different from those assigned in the experimental design (e.g.,
spend more time outdoors in sunlight).
23 These types of behavioral changes were not addressed in the
developing the survey because results of two previous skin cancer studies suggest that offsetting or reinforcing
substitutions are not a major factor considered by adults when initially evaluating the new sun lotions.
24 The
possibility that parents perceived different risk reductions than those assigned is considered further below.
Parents participating in the ﬁeld study were told the lifetime risk reductions that would result from use of the
new sun lotion and that achieving these risk reductions would require lifetime use of the product. Therefore assume
that the parent would prefer not to purchase the sun lotion for herself now, unless she envisioned continuing to use
it in the future. Likewise, she would prefer not to purchase the sun lotion for her child now, unless she believed that
he would use it in the future. Also, the ﬁrst period’s supply of the sun lotion is offered as a single purchase decision
for the parent and child together, rather than as a separate purchase decision for each. In consequence, the parent
decides that neither she nor her child will use the sun lotion at all ðS
j
it ¼ S ¼ 0Þ, or that both will use it now and in
the future ðS
j
it ¼ S ¼ 1Þ. The possibility that only one of the two individuals would use the sun lotion or that the
parent would envision using it for other children in the family is addressed below.
Suppose that the required expenditure for the lotion for the parent and child together during t ¼ 0 is denoted X
j,
and that in subsequent periods, when the child makes his own allocation decisions, each individual may purchase the
sun lotion in an amount for one person at half of this expenditure, X
j/2. Then the parent’s maximal lifetime utility






b, S ¼ 1), where
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p=qXjÞ¼   lp þð 1=2Þð1 þ rÞ









23The introduction of the new sun lotion might be more generally modeled by assuming that its market price falls below the choke price
for some consumers resulting in positive quantities purchased. This price reduction will result in a potential re-alignment of other activities
and expenditures on other goods and thus an increase in consumer surplus (see [23] for details). Heterogeneity of choke prices among
sample members is handled, albeit crudely, by conducting split sample analyses for high and low income parents (as well as for parents
differing in other demographic characteristics) and by estimating one speciﬁcation in which costs of sun lotions are expressed as shares of
income rather than as absolute dollar amounts (see below).
24In two previous skin cancer surveys, attempts were made to account for possible substitutions that might inﬂuence endogenously
perceived risk changes associated with hypothetical sun lotions. In Dickie and Gerking [17], an indicator for whether respondents used
current sunscreen in order to stay outdoors longer was not signiﬁcantly related to the perceived risk reduction associated with a
hypothetical sun lotion. In Dickie and Gerking [18], respondents were asked whether using a hypothetical sun lotion would lead them or
their children to spend more time outdoors in sunlight. Fewer than 10% of parents responded afﬁrmatively, and indicators for this type of
substitution were not signiﬁcantly related to perceived risk changes associated with the hypothetical sun lotion, or with willingness to pay
for it. These results suggested that the possibility of offsetting substitutions would not be a major factor considered by parents when they
initially evaluated the new sun lotions and consequently no questions concerning this type of behavior were included in the present study.
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j
i denote the lifetime risk changes resulting from use of the sun lotion in all periods and nt denotes
the number of users of the sun lotion in period t whom the parent cares about (if Z40, n0 ¼ 2 ¼ n1, n2 ¼ 1
because the parent cares about the child in all periods, while if Z ¼ 0, n0 ¼ 2, n1 ¼ 1, n2 ¼ 0 because the parent
cares about the child only in t ¼ 0). As shown in Eq. (10), the child’s decision to purchase the sun lotion in
periods t ¼ 1 and 2 affects the parent’s welfare if Z40.
The parent’s willingness to pay for the sun lotion per period, WTP
j, is the value of X
j that equates
U ð Þ   ¯ U; where ¯ U denotes the parent’s maximal lifetime utility if neither she nor her child uses the sun
lotion. Applying the implicit function theorem to this identity and using Eq. (10) implies that marginal
































; j ¼ a;b. ð11Þ
In this equation d
j










k=lp denote the parent’s






denotes the fraction of the present value of total planned expenditures on the sun
lotion that occur in the ﬁrst period. Because bo1, coefﬁcients of lifetime risk reductions understate the
parent’s marginal willingness to pay for risk reduction; i.e., ﬁrst-period expenditures on sun lotion do not













pÞ equals the parent’s marginal rate of
substitution between equal percentage risk changes for herself and for her child. If the parent is altruistic, this
marginal rate of substitution equals unity.
25


















þ controlsh þ  
j
h. (12)




k denote dummy variables each coded with values of 0.1 or 0.5 to represent the
proportionate reductions in the jth risk for the parent and the child that were presented on the sun lotion




i, i ¼ p,k, (2) controls refers to effects on willingness to pay of measured parental
characteristics such as income and family size, and (3)  
j
h denotes a random disturbance term with standard
properties included to capture unobserved characteristics of parent h. These characteristics might include
willingness to try new products, the ability to process the information presented on the sun lotion label,
evaluation of joint outputs such as sunburn protection and skin aging, as well as other factors that inﬂuence
whether the product would be purchased.




p ¼ 1. But a test of this hypothesis does not distinguish between types of altruism that may
motivate parents’ stated intentions to purchase the sun lotion, because qUp=qR
j
k and Z are not separately
identiﬁed; both are components of g
j
k. Distinguishing between the types of altruistic motivations considered in
Section 2 must await further research that contrasts parental behavior toward both young and adult children.
In any case, the test does not rest on directly estimating WTP for risk reduction, but instead on estimating the




consistently estimated, but it is not necessary to obtain a consistent estimate of g
j
0:
Second, as previously noted in Section 3, the sun lotion labels are used in the survey to randomly assign
reductions in skin cancer risks. An advantage of this procedure is that the risk reductions presented are
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25Non-monetary costs of using the sun lotion such as time costs of ensuring proper application and disutility from odor or other product
attributes are assumed equal for parent and child. The description of the sun lotion attempted to minimize time requirements by indicating
that one application would last all day and to control for potential sources of disutility such as odor, allergic reactions and blocking of
pores. The description was constant across all labels. To the extent that non-monetary costs differ between parent and child, however, the
costs would be confounded in the d
j
i coefﬁcients.
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and to parent characteristics captured by  
j
h. This means that if the functional form of Eq. (12) is correct: (1)
endogeneity problems in estimating the g
j
i are avoided, and (2) estimates of the g
j
i are unaffected by the choice
of variables to include in controls. The randomly assigned risk reductions, however, are relevant to testing the
null hypotheses that g
j
k=gj
p ¼ 1, j ¼ a,b, only if they are proportional to the respondents’ perceived percentage







i i ¼ p,k, where f
j can differ
between the two risks (j ¼ a,b), but for a given risk it must be constant across respondents and the same value
must be taken for both the parent and child.
Third, willingness to pay for the sun lotion is treated in an errors-in-variables framework in which stated
willingness to pay ðW
j
hÞ by parent h to reduce the jth risk differs from true willingness to pay ðWTP
j
hÞ by both









h þ aj þ n
j
h; j ¼ a;b. (13)
In Eq. (13), a




h is a random disturbance. a
j is assumed to represent systematic
misstatement of true willingness to pay. For example, parents may misstate willingness to pay because the choice of
whether to buy the sun lotion was presented as a hypothetical question and/or may not have been adequately
considered in light of preferences and ﬁnancial constraints.
26 Also, n
j
h captures unobserved parent-speciﬁc
heterogeneity as well as purely random factors that may affect a parent’s stated willingness to pay for the label pre-
sented. The n
j
h are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance and the possibility that
Eðva
hvb
hÞa0 motivates joint estimation of willingness-to-pay equations for the two types of risk.
The marginal rate of substitution ðg
j
k=gj






















h; j ¼ a;b. (14)
Notice that estimators of the constant term ðg
j
0Þ will be inconsistent if, as expected, a
j6¼0. Also, estimators of
coefﬁcients of parent characteristics included in controls will be inconsistent if the controls are correlated with
the composite error ðo
j




hÞ. Nevertheless, consistent estimators of g
j
k and gj
p still can be obtained as
long as Eq. (14) is correctly speciﬁed, because the two risk reduction variables are experimental design points
that were assigned independently of parent characteristics.
Fourth, the dependent variable W
j
h (stated willingness to pay for a one year’s supply of sun lotion) is latent:
parents only were asked to state whether they would be willing to make a randomly assigned expenditure. Parents




h,w h e r eP
j
h denotes the expenditure for a 1 year supply of sun





























symmetrically distributed. These features together with an assumption of normally distributed composite
errors that have an expected non-zero covariance across equations Eðoa
hob
hÞ¼saba0 motivates estimation by
bivariate probit, where r ¼ sab=sasb. Following Cameron and James [10], the coefﬁcient of the randomly
assigned sun lotion price is interpreted as an estimate of  1/s
j that can be used to recover unnormalized
coefﬁcients of risk reductions ðg
j
iÞ from the normalized estimates of gi
j/s
j.
Fifth, Eq. (12) speciﬁes that the marginal value of risk reduction diminishes as risk rises so that g
j
i remains
constant. To test the adequacy of this speciﬁcation, which treats willingness to pay as a linear function of
percentage risk changes, separate regressions were run for low-risk and high-risk groups. The null hypothesis
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26This speciﬁcation does not remedy all potential problems with hypothetical valuation questions. For example, Carson et al. [12]
examine incentive compatibility of binary discrete-choice valuation questions for new private goods. They argue that if subjects believe
that survey responses will inﬂuence whether the new good will be provided, then any respondent having a positive probability of wanting
the good would have an incentive to indicate that she would purchase the good. This effect would cause overstatement of purchase
intentions and insensitivity to risk changes and costs. On the other hand, subjects who believe that the new good will be provided for sure
but who believe that survey responses will inﬂuence the price of the good would have an incentive to appear more price-sensitive than they
actually are. This effect would cause excess sensitivity to costs. The speciﬁcation in Eq. (13) does not address these problems but instead
treats misstatement of willingness to pay as an individual-speciﬁc error that is unrelated to risk changes or costs.
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risk groups was not rejected at conventional levels. This result occurred whether morbidity risk or conditional
mortality risk of the parent or the child was used to distinguish between low and high-risk groups. The test was
based on the ﬁrst speciﬁcation reported in Table 5 below.
Sixth, a concern is that use of stated preference data to estimate the willingness to pay function will result in
a comparatively large variance of the composite error ðo
j




hÞ. Stated preference data are often ‘‘noisy’’
and this feature could lead to wide conﬁdence intervals around the estimated values of marginal rates of
substitution, thus making it more likely that the null hypothesis tested will not be rejected.
4.2. Results
Full information maximum likelihood bivariate probit estimates are shown in Table 5.
27 Sample means of
covariates are presented along with the regression estimates. Two pairs of estimates are reported. The ﬁrst uses
four design points as covariates and the second shows the outcome when two controls for parent
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Table 5
Willingness to pay to reduce skin cancer risks: bivariate probit estimates (N ¼ 488)
Covariate (parameter notation)
Sample mean (Std. Dev.) or
















Parent’s percentage risk reduction 0.289 0.302 0.912 0.717 0.901 0.739
ðgj
p=sjÞ (0.200) (0.200) (0.272) (0.267) (0.274) (0.267)
Child’s percentage risk reduction 0.300 0.299 0.854 1.426 0.843 1.487
ðg
j
k=sjÞ (0.200) (0.200) (0.270) (0.267) (0.275) (0.272)
Cost of sun lotion ($/year) 64.518 64.150  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.011
ð 1=sjÞ (34.520) (34.897) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Order ( ¼ 1 if risk change in column
presented last, 0 if ﬁrst)
0.488 0.512  0.149  0.087  0.151  0.105
(0.122) (0.122) (0.126) (0.125)
Family income ($10,000/year) 5.957 0.028 0.029
(3.569) (0.018) (0.017)
Number of children in family 2.078  0.190  0.004
(0.952) (0.069) (0.068)
Constant 0.733 0.520 0.981 0.347
ððg
j
0 þ ajÞ=sjÞ (0.171) (0.170) (0.251) (0.229)
Error correlation 0.778 0.788
ðrÞ (0.044) (0.044)




p ¼ 1 may computed using coefﬁcient estimates above and elements of the covariance matrix for coefﬁcients of
proportional risk changes for parent morbidity, child morbidity, parent conditional mortality, and child conditional mortality shown,
respectively, below.
Design points only With income and number of children
Parent morbidity 0.0739 0.0753
Child morbidity  0.0029 0.0729  0.0058 0.0754
Parent conditional mortality 0.0016  0.0018 0.0714  0.0002  0.0021 0.0715
Child conditional mortality  0.0044 0.0010  0.0028 0.0713  0.0041  0.0010  0.0027 0.0738
27Ordinary least squares estimates were used as initial values in computing the binomial probit estimates used as starting values for the
bivariate probit routine. Coefﬁcient estimates and estimates of the marginal rate of substitution between child and parent risks from the
binomial probit estimates are broadly consistent with those reported in Tables 4 and 5, but are less precisely estimated.
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measure skin cancer risk changes for the parent and the child (see Eq. (14)) and a third measures the randomly
assigned sun lotion price. A fourth design point variable is added to control for the order in which the
morbidity and conditional mortality labels were shown.
Consider ﬁrst the pair of estimated regressions that use only design points as covariates. The estimated value
of r( ¼ 0.778) is positive, as expected, and signiﬁcantly different from zero, indicating an efﬁciency gain from
joint estimation of the two equations. The coefﬁcients of the required annual expenditure are negative and
differ signiﬁcantly from zero at 1%, suggesting that parents were more reluctant to purchase the sun lotion at
higher costs than at lower costs. Additionally, coefﬁcients of variables measuring percentage reductions in the
two types of risk to both parent and child are positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% level in
each of the two equations. This outcome suggests that parents are willing to pay more for larger than for
smaller reductions in the two types of risk and is consistent with the conceptual model presented in Section 2.
Comparing these coefﬁcients to the estimated intercept, however, appears to suggest that increases in risk
reduction do not bring about proportionate increases in willingness to pay. Many previous studies have found
that stated willingness to pay does not increase proportionately with increases in risk reductions (see [22] for
further discussion of this issue). Nevertheless, this conclusion may not apply because the (unnormalized)
intercepts actually are estimates of ðg
j
0 þ ajÞ rather than g
j
0, and a
j40 if parents tend to overstate purchase
intentions. Also, as mentioned previously, coefﬁcients understate willingness to pay for reduced risk because
bo1. Estimates also show that the order in which the morbidity and conditional mortality labels were
presented is unimportant.
When controls for income and family size are introduced, estimates again indicate positive correlation
between the errors in the two equations (0.788). Coefﬁcients of family income are positive while coefﬁcients of
the total number of children in the family are negative as expected. These coefﬁcients, however, are not
consistently estimated if income and family size are correlated with unobserved family characteristics
inﬂuencing the sun lotion purchase decision. Income coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly different from zero only at
the 10% level under a two-tail test, suggesting a weak tendency for parents’ willingness to pay to increase with
income. The small effect of income may simply reﬂect the relatively low costs of the sun lotion, with the
highest cost reaching only about $10/month. Coefﬁcients of the number of children are signiﬁcant at the 1%
level, providing evidence that parents reduce protective expenditures per family member when more children
are present. Because the risk change variables are orthogonal to these parent characteristics, coefﬁcients and
standard errors of risk changes are little altered from their corresponding values discussed previously.
28
Table 6 reports tests of whether the equilibrium condition implied by altruism holds ðg
j
k=gj
p   1 ¼ 0;
j ¼ a;bÞ. Column (2), Table 6, labeled ‘‘full sample,’’ reports results based on Table 5 estimates that control
only for design points. Standard errors are computed using the delta method. As shown, the null hypothesis
that this equilibrium condition holds is not rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels in either the
unconditional morbidity or conditional mortality equations. This null hypothesis also is not rejected using a
Wald test of the restriction g
j
k=gj
p   1 ¼ 0 in both equations jointly.
Remaining columns of Table 6 summarize outcomes of parallel tests in six sub-samples deﬁned according to
the gender of parent, gender of child, and age of child. Results for these sub-samples were obtained by re-
estimating the willingness-to-pay equations separately by sub-sample using only the four experimental design
points as covariates. Parent gender is considered because the unitary model assumes that families act as if
maximizing a single utility function, so that decisions made by mothers should be consistent with those made
by fathers. Gender and age of child are considered because parental marginal rates of substitution should not
differ between children as long as marginal costs of risk reduction are the same, as in this ﬁeld study. As shown
in Table 6, results are consistent with the hypothesis g
j
k=gj
p ¼ 1 in all six sub-samples. Furthermore, likelihood
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28Supplementary regressions speciﬁed like those in the last pair of columns of Table 5 but also including covariates for marital status,
education, age and gender of parent, age and gender of child, and whether a close relative had been diagnosed with skin cancer also
demonstrated this same result. In this expanded regression, coefﬁcients of the risk change variables were virtually unchanged as compared
with those presented in Table 5. Only two of the additional 14 coefﬁcients differed signiﬁcantly from zero at 10%. The two variables with
signiﬁcant coefﬁcients were parent gender in the morbidity equation and child age in the conditional mortality equation. Also, in
regressions including only experimental design points and the constructed measures of perceived latency for parents and children, three of
the four latency coefﬁcients were negative as expected, but none was signiﬁcant.
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gender of child.
29
Although not reported in Table 6, a comparable analysis was undertaken based on sub-samples deﬁned by
family income and by age and education of parent. This analysis is motivated by possible heterogeneity in
choke prices for the new sun lotion and by the assumed constancy of coefﬁcients of the willingness to pay
functions, relative to the possibility that the marginal utility of income, the b term in Eq. (11), or other
parameters may vary with characteristics of the parent.
30 However, the null hypothesis that parameters of
willingness to pay functions are equal between families with high or low income, or between parents with and




1 is not rejected in any of these additional sub-samples.
31
As explained in Section 3, each parent was asked to consider buying the new sun lotions for herself and her
sample child but not for anyone else. Since most parents had more than one child, some parents may have
found this purchase scenario implausible and may have responded as if considering buying the sun lotion for
all of their young children. This possibility was investigated in several ways. First, willingness to pay equations
were re-estimated separately for parents having only one versus more than one child, using the four design
points as covariates. The null hypothesis that slope coefﬁcients do not differ between single- and multiple-child
families was not rejected at conventional levels (p4.9). Also, the main hypothesis of the study ðg
j
k=gj
p ¼ 1Þ was






p and altruism tests
Full sample Mothers Fathers Daughters Sons Child age 3–7 Child age 8–12
Morbidity ratio 0.936 0.927 0.88 0.902 0.96 1.438 0.441
ðga
k=ga
pÞ (0.415) (0.456) (0.678) (0.777) (0.503) (0.766) (0.462)
z-Test ratio ¼ 1( p) 0.878 0.873 0.860 0.900 0.937 0.568 0.226
Conditional mortality ratio 2.005 1.816 3.746 1.512 3.003 5.018 0.661
ðgb
k=gb
pÞ (0.853) (0.837) (6.133) (0.702) (2.688) (4.962) (0.417)
z-Test ratio ¼ 1( p) 0.240 0.329 0.654 0.465 0.456 0.418 0.416
Wald test, both ratios ¼ 1( p) 0.493 0.608 0.883 0.761 0.750 0.601 0.398
Sample size 488 368 120 242 246 275 213
LR test, equal parameters between groups (p) 0.975 0.958 0.214
29The null hypotheses that slope coefﬁcients of the equations do not differ by gender of parent, or by gender or age of child, after
allowing for different intercepts, were each separately tested using likelihood ratio tests. Results, available at the Internet site http://
www.aere.org/journal/index/html indicated that the null hypothesis of equal slopes would not be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance
levels in any comparison. Further analysis of the role of parent gender was conducted by re-estimating the model in the last two columns of
Table 5 while including a dummy variable for parent gender and interactions of this variable and all covariates. The only statistically
signiﬁcant difference between male and female parents was found in the coefﬁcient of the number of children in the morbidity equation,
where female willingness to pay for the sun lotion declined less than male willingness to pay with increases in the number of children.
Coefﬁcients of risk changes, annual cost and income appear to be the same for mothers and fathers. Also, outcomes of all of these tests by
parent gender are the same if the comparison is restricted to married parents.
30A related issue involves whether parents differed in their perceptions of available substitutes for the hypothetical sun lotion. The
survey would have been improved had parents been asked how skin cancer risks could have been reduced by the amounts shown on the
labels if the product were not available or if they chose not to buy it. In the absence of this information, we assume that either substitution
opportunities are negligible or are the same for all parents.
31Further investigation of the role of income focused on (1) whether coefﬁcients of the cost of sunscreen lotions varied by income group
while holding other slope coefﬁcients constant, and separately on (2) whether altruism test outcomes would differ if sun lotion costs were
re-expressed as shares of income rather than absolute dollar amounts. No signiﬁcant differences in coefﬁcients of the cost of sunscreen
lotions were detected between high and low income groups, or between ﬁve more narrowly deﬁned income groups. As mentioned
previously, the small effect of income may reﬂect the low annual expenditures considered in the ﬁeld study. When sun lotion costs were re-
expressed as shares of family income, coefﬁcients of the transformed cost variables were negative while coefﬁcients of risk change variables
remained positive, and all six of these coefﬁcients were signiﬁcant at 1%. The null hypothesis g
j
k=gj
p ¼ 1 was not rejected in this
speciﬁcation.
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the lack of signiﬁcant differences in slope coefﬁcients of willingness to pay functions between single- and
multiple-child families suggests that parents did not envision using the sun lotion to protect additional
children when stating their purchase intentions. A more complete investigation of this issue would also control
for the age distribution of other children in the family, but information on the ages of children other than the
sample child was not collected in the survey.
Second, parents who indicated that they would buy the sun lotion were asked about the intended users. The
majority of parents indicated that the lotion would be used for the parent and the sample child (85% for the
morbidity labels and 90% for the conditional mortality labels), with almost all of the remaining purchasers
intending to use the lotion for the child only.
32 After excluding parents who envisioned purchasing the
sunscreen but using it for only one individual from the full sample regression, the hypothesis g
j
k=gj
p ¼ 1 was not
rejected. Third, because parents were told that achieving the stated risk reductions required use of the lotion as
directed, the test of g
j
k=gj
p ¼ 1 was performed again after adjusting the risk change measures of Table 5 so that
the risk change would be zero for the parent or child if the parent did not envision that person using the sun
lotion. The null hypothesis was not rejected using these adjusted measures of risk changes.
5. Summary and conclusions
Special protection of young children from environmental hazards has become a worldwide priority of
government policies to improve human health. The fundamental tension between altruism and self-interest in
families looms as a crucial behavioral factor determining the effectiveness of these policies. This paper
estimates parents’ marginal rates of substitution between skin cancer risks faced by 488 parents and their
children between the ages of 3 and 12 years. A household production model of altruistic family behavior that
incorporates household production of latent health risk guides the estimates. The model demonstrates that the
marginal rate of substitution between risks faced by the parent and child is equal to the ratio of marginal risk
reduction costs. Resulting empirical estimates then focus on whether this equality holds.
Tests rest on an examination of stated preference values for a hypothetical sun lotion. Although stated
preference valuation is a controversial method of obtaining willingness to pay to reduce environmental risks, it
supports consistent estimation of parents’ marginal rates of substitution between health risks to themselves
and corresponding health risks to their children in the ﬁeld study described here. Consistent estimation of
marginal rates of substitution is made possible by: (1) allowing for both systematic and random errors in
parents’ stated willingness to pay for the sun lotion, and (2) randomly assigning skin cancer risk reductions
offered by sun lotion to the sample of parents. Together, these innovations imply that the skin cancer risk
reductions assigned are orthogonal both to parent characteristics and to errors parents may make in assessing
their willingness to pay for the sun lotion.
In the theoretical model, an altruistic parent’s marginal rate of substitution between risk to her child and
risk to herself equates with the corresponding ratio of marginal skin cancer risk reduction costs. This
prediction is the basis of the null hypothesis for econometric tests using data from the ﬁeld study. The null
hypothesis is not rejected, so test results support the notion that parents are altruistic toward their young
children.
This outcome runs counter to evidence against altruism presented in earlier studies (e.g. [3,28]). Whereas the
earlier studies analyzed ﬁnancial transfers between parents and their adult children who have formed
households of their own, this study looks at how parents allocate health-protective goods between themselves
and their pre-teenage children living at home. This contrast in perspectives raises at least three possible
explanations for the differing results obtained. First, parents may behave as paternalistic altruists toward their
young children, while not exhibiting the concern for the overall welfare of adult children that has been the
basis for previous tests of altruism. Second, parents may continue to display paternalistic altruism toward
adult children, but may limit ﬁnancial transfers because the adult child’s preferences are not aligned with the
parent’s and the parent can no longer dictate the child’s consumption choices. A third possible reason why
ARTICLE IN PRESS
32Four parents who indicated that they would purchase one of the sun lotions envisioned using it for themselves only (three for the
morbidity labels and one for the conditional mortality labels).
M. Dickie, S. Gerking / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 53 (2007) 323–341 339altruism could be detected here but not in work on money transfers is that public income support programs
may already have crowded out intra-household ﬁnancial transfers between relatives in developed countries
[15], whereas government efforts to reduce children’s environmental health risks may not have fully crowded
out parental investments. In any case, an important implication of ﬁndings from this study is that effectiveness
of public intervention programs to reduce environmental risks faced by children may be compromised to some
extent because parents will respond by redistributing family resources.
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